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Abstract
General polygyny { near universal marriage and polygyny { is common in
Africa. But why would men marry n wives for 1/n:th of the time instead of
monogamously? Downsides include prolonged bachelorhood and a high degree
of step-parenting. We point to the African slave trade which disproportionately
removed young men, thus allowing old men to take young wives. Modeling en-
dogenous social stigma, we argue that this temporary perturbation permanently
changed the equilibrium to one where all men marry late and polygynously.
Data are supportive: polygyny in Africa delays rst marriage for men, raises
under-ve mortality, but does not predict life-long bachelorhood.
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libria; child mortality.
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1 Introduction
The disproportional allocation of young women to rich and powerful men has a
clear cut logic to it, be it Darwinian [Trivers, 1972] or neo-classical [Becker, 1974].
However, that is only one form of polygyny. Another form has all men taking several
wives. This \general" form of polygyny is common in Africa but rare elsewhere
[White, 1988]. It is made possible by men's marrying late; and women's marrying
young and often [Dorjahn, 1958, Goody, 1973, 1976, Pison, 1986, Borgerho Mulder,
1989, Garenne and Walle, 1989, Hayase and Liaw, 1997, Timaeus and Reynar, 1998,
Gibson and Mace, 2007].
While mathematically possible, general polygyny poses as puzzle. All men mar-
rying polygynously suggests male (relative to female) homogeneity, in which case
theory predicts monogamy [Becker, 1974]. Although this allocation need not lit-
erally be in the form of one wife per man, transactions costs alone suggests that
one wife would be preferable to n wives for 1/n:th of the time. Moreover, the brief
marriage duration necessitated by multiple wives is often achieved by marriage de-
lay for men and thus extended bachelorhood. Other drawbacks of polygyny include
early widowhood and remarriage for women, and thus fatherless children and a high
degree of step-parenting.
In this paper, we propose that the prevalence of general polygyny in Africa traces
its origins to the African slave trade which disproportionately removed young males
[Fage, 1980, Manning, 1990]. While there was also a market for female slaves, the
numerically most important slave trade was male dominated, demand being driven
by plantations in the Americas.1 As a result, young women outnumbered young men,
facilitating polygyny during the slave trade [Fage, 1980, Manning, 1990, Thornton,
1997]. Wrote Manning [1990, pp. 22-23]:
\Slave exports brought about substantial distortions in African sex ra-
tios: along the West Coast most male slaves were exported and the re-
1Female-biased trades to the Orient were much smaller in scale than the male-biased Atlatnic
slave trades. Moreover, in the case of female-biased trades, male captives retained in Africa were
made domestic slaves. And slave males married only infrequently as their masters take the women
[Manning, 1990]. Therefore, female-biased slave trades did not lead to polyandry. Moreover, the
conditions for polyandry to arise are not symmetric to those for polygyny, see Korn [2000], Edlund
and Korn [2002].
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maining population became predominantly female; in the Savanna and
Horn most slaves exported to the Orient were female, so that the remain-
ing population became dominantly male. The result of these imbalances
was that the institution of slavery, of marriage, and the sexual division
of labor were placed under great pressure to change."
But why would slave trade in the past explain current marriage patterns? Young
women no longer outnumber young men. The mechanism, we argue, was a change
in social norms: the slave trade reduced the stigma attached to marriage between a
young woman and an old man.
To model general polygyny, we consider a population with men and women who
have two adult periods, young and old. Women are fecund when young while men
are fecund when young and old. The purpose of marriage is children. Thus, in
each period, marriage can be between a young woman and a young man or a young
woman and an old man. Men and women are homogenous within age and sex cells.
We assume that marriage between an old man and a young woman carries stigma,
the degree of which depends on the prevalence of the practice. Young women de-
liberating marriage do not know the stigma they will face in the event they marry
an old man since that will depend on their not yet realized actions. Our key as-
sumption is that individuals act based on expectations of stigma and that they look
to the past when forming their expectation { expectations that in equilibrium are
conrmed. In this set up, there can be multiple equilibria. A temporary removal of
young men can result in a permanent lowering of stigma and thus a shift towards
women marrying older men. This process, we propose, captures the mechanism
through which historic slave trade continues to cast a shadow on current African
marriage patterns.
The shift towards older men, we argue, corresponds to more polygyny. In our
model, this will literally be the case because men marry both as young and old,
and there is no divorce. As a result, marriage when old amounts to bigamy. While
this particular modeling may seem contrived, what amounts to more polygyny is
a surprisingly thorny question. In the case of general polygyny, more polygyny is
by necessity a question of the degree of bunching up of wives over a man's lifetime.
More concurrent wives means briefer marriage duration which for practical purposes
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means later marriage. In inequality-driven polygyny, rich men deprive poor men
of wives. By contrast, in general polygyny, the old deprive the young. Thus, a
marriage market shift towards old men may be considered a shift towards more
polygyny. While not the only way to characterize polygyny it may be a reasonable
description of general polygyny.
Empirically, we examine whether polygyny in Africa can be explained by the
past slave trades (see Dalton and Leung [2011] below); whether polygyny is char-
acterized by general polygyny; and the possibility that polygyny is inecient. To
that end, we combine Nunn [2008]'s data on the historic slave trades with data on
polygyny and marital outcomes (from the United Nations and World Bank). Ana-
lyzing country-level data for Africa, we nd that the extent of polygyny (married
women over married men) predicts larger spousal age gaps at rst marriage, but
not a greater incidence of never married men, consistent with general polygyny.
Moreover, countries with more polygyny are shown to have lower marital output
as measured by infant and child mortality, a nding more easily reconciled with
general polygyny than with quality-based polygyny. These patterns are found both
in OLS estimates and when, following Nunn [2008], polygyny is instrumented for
using distances to the dierent slave markets, the Atlantic trade in particular.
Our paper adds to a small but growing literature in economics seeking to ex-
plain the robust negative relationship between polygyny and economic development
evident in cross-country comparisons or secular trends [Tertilt, 2005, Gould et al.,
2008, Lagerlof, 2010, Edlund and Lagerlof, 2010]. Our nding of a sizeable contribu-
tion of polygyny to under-ve mortality chimes with Udry [1996]'s documentation
of substantial intra-household ineciency among rural households in Burkina Faso,
the most polygynous country in our data set.2 We are obviously also related to
the literature that links the history of slave trade to the evolution of institutions
detrimental to growth and development (in source or destination countries, for the
former see e.g., Nunn [2008], Nunn and Wantchekon [2011], for the latter see e.g.,
Engerman and Sokolo [1997, 2002]).
2Whether polygyny contributes to the ineciency is not the focus of the paper, but it can be
noted that it may be a factor in the lack of support for the unitary household model. Kazianga and
Klonner [2009] also documents ineciencies in intra-household allocation in a sample of polygynous
households in rural Mali.
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The work most closely related to ours is Dalton and Leung [2011] who (inde-
pendently of us) linked polygyny in West Africa to past slave trades using DHS
data. However, their paper does not address how a past demographic shock can
aect current levels of polygyny, the focus of the paper at hand. The found link be-
tween past slave trade and current levels of polygyny was conrmed by Fenske [2012]
who also examined a number of other correlates of present day polygyny in Africa.
Interestingly, he found past but not current male inequality to predict polygyny.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
literature review. Section 3 presents our model. Sections 4 and 5 present the data
and our empirical estimates. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background
Two-sided matching and absence of idiosyncratic preference orderings oer a com-
pelling theoretical framework for analyzing the causes and consequences of polygyny.
Polygyny, in this framework, results from high male relative to female heterogeneity
[Trivers, 1972, Becker, 1974], abetted by low paternal input in ospring production.
It is ecient (like any stable matching in this framework), but disadvantages low
quality males. While general polygyny is recognized as a key feature of African
marriage patterns, its poor t with the above framework has left it understudied by
economists. This background section organizes the literature into (somewhat arbi-
trary) subsections: \Causes and Consequences of Polygyny" and \Social norms."
2.1 Causes and Consequences of Polygyny
A universal feature of marriage is the so called paternity presumption: the father(s)
of a child born to a married woman is her husband(s) [Posner, 1992]. Polygyny, one
man several wives, occupies an interval on a continuum of marriage forms described
by the number of husbands per wife: < 1, in the case of polygyny, > 1 in the case
of polyandry. The number of men required to support the children of one woman is
thus one factor behind the realized marriage form.
When this number is high, e.g., from poorness of the land [Korn, 2000], polyandry
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can result.3 If, by contrast, this number is low, for instance from high degree of self
suciency of women [Boserup, 1970, Trivers, 1972], polygyny is facilitated. In that
spirit, Jacoby [1995] found that conditional on wealth men have more wives when
the agricultural productivity of women is higher.
Subsistence, however, only dictates necessary conditions. Other factors noted
in the literature include male (relative to female) inequality, skewed sex ratios and
political pandering.
2.1.1 Causes of Polygyny
Male inequality
\The question as it presents itself in practice to a woman, is whether it
is better to have, say a whole share in a tenth-rate man or a tenth share
in a rst-rate man."
George Bernard Shaw, Getting Married, 1907.
As pointed out by Becker [1974], polygyny can be the outcome of the ecient
allocation of women when men are more heterogeneous than women. In that case,
we would expect low quality men to remain life-long bachelors (and high quality
men to have many wives). Moreover, we would expect children (and women) to
do better in societies that allowed for polygyny, and within a society, polygynous
families would do at least as well as monogamous ones (controlling for wife quality).
Grossbard [1976] is an early empirical application.
Becker [1974] viewed marriage form as endogenous, religious and other social
prescriptions regulating polygyny being reections rather than drivers of the ob-
served marriage patterns. Gould et al. [2008] is paper in that spirit. They argued
that from economic development follows increasing emphasis on child quality. As a
result, men become more interested in the quality of their children instead of their
quantity. Fewer children necessitate fewer wives. Moreover, to the extent that qual-
ity depends on maternal quality, there will be a shift in emphasis from female ability
to bear children to women's human capital. Assuming that the latter is less evenly
distributed, women become more heterogeneous, which in turn promotes monogamy
3For polyandry, also see Edlund and Korn [2002].
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(because it raises the price of high quality women, further limiting the number of
wives bought by high quality men).
Female sex-ratios
It has long been recognized that a surplus of (young) females over men facilitates
polygyny, cf. Spencer [1876]. This surplus can result from population growth (if
men marry younger women), the elimination of men, and/or the addition of women.
Additionally, any society or social group that can maintain a permanent numer-
ical surplus of (young) women over men can also practice polygyny. This surplus
may be curtesy of high socio-economic status that attracts young women, or through
constant warfare which reduces the number of young men (in battle) and increases
that of women (through capture).
Political Economy
Any marriage system which condemns a majority of the population to
celibacy will be violently wrecked on the pretext that it outrages moral-
ity.
George Bernard Shaw, Maxims for Revolutionists, 1903.
If polygyny is at the expense of low quality men (cf. Becker [1991]), then monogamy
might be understood as a populist measure, made to appease low quality men who
otherwise would face steep marriage odds [Lagerlof, 2010].
By contrast, our paper point to the possibility of polygyny being inecient, its
occurrence owing more to accidents of history than eciency arguments. If general
polygyny is inecient, norms encouraging monogamy might be ecient.
Other
Polygyny correlates with a number of other factors. The extent to which they have
been proposed as explanations, consequences, or neither, vary. For a further review
see, e.g., White and Burton [1988].
Nineteenth century evolutionary theorists such as Engels and Spencer noted
that polygyny was a feature of primitive societies [Spencer, 1876, Engels, 1972, rst
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published in 1884]. The bunching up of women facilitates a long post-partum sex
taboo [Whiting, 1964], although the extent to which this feature can account for
polygyny can been questioned [Ember, 1974]. It has also been noted that rules
prescribing in-marriage restricts polygyny since the sex ratio within a kin group is
likely to be balanced.
Goody [1976] observed that dowry giving (chiey European or Hindu) societies
gravitate towards monogamy because when daughters are endowed rather than sold
o for a bride price, parents will take greater care to marry them positively assor-
tatively, a notion that becomes impractical, if not in-operational, if the husband is
free to add wives. Still, each wife could be associated with a clearly dened set of
property, much like a man in Imperial China could take one wife for each ancestral
branch he was heir to. Moreover, and importantly, as Hartung [1982] has pointed
out, causality might be reverse: polygyny leading to male only inheritance.
2.1.2 Eects of Polygyny
While Becker [1991] argued that polygyny allowed for the ecient allocation of
women when men are heterogeneous (relative to women), the robust negative rela-
tionship between polygyny and various measures of economic development and the
status of women have prompted a search for theoretical reasons for why polygyny
might hamper development. Tertilt [2005] proposed that the higher price daughters
command under polygyny crowds out savings and investments. Thus, she pointed to
a possible negative eect of polygyny. Edlund and Lagerlof [2010] pointed to general
polygyny reducing steady state human capital because men spend a lower fraction of
their lives being fathers. Neither study addressed how (inecient) polygyny might
arise in the rst place.
Although polygyny raises demand for women, higher demand need not benet
women and on balance ethnographic studies nd polygyny to be negatively viewed
by women, co-wife rivalry being an important vector of stress [Meekers and Franklin,
1995, Agadjanian and Ezeh, 2000, Madhavan, 2002, Jankowiak et al., 2005, Bove
and Valeggia, 2009]. A possible reason is that in most polygynous societies, women
do not own themselves. Arranged marriage, with bride price going to the father of
the bride, characterizes Sub-Saharan Africa.
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Another reason is suggested by Trivers and Willard [1973] who pointed to t-
ness reasons why parents would bias resources towards sons (more resources, more
daughters-in-law, more grandchildren), tamped under monogamy [Hartung, 1982].
Thus, evolutionary biology suggests a reason for why the correlation between mar-
riage and inheritance pattern may be causal (but run in the opposite direction of that
proposed by Goody [1976]). Evolutionary biology also sees direct negative eects
to females of polygyny (and benets to males), whenever male parental investments
potentially extend beyond the siring of children [Verner, 1964, Verner and Wilson,
1966, Orians, 1969, Trivers, 1972, Davies, 1989, Maynard Smith, 1977].
With respect to child outcomes, on balance, polygyny has been associated with
negative outcomes, including: mortality [Strassmann, 38, Omariba and Boyle, 2007,
Gyimah, 2009], anthropometric measures [Sellen, 1999, Hadley, 2005, Gibson and
Mace, 2007], low paternal involvement [Kitahara, 1974, Wilson, 2008], and co-wife
rivalry (harms step-children) [Madhavan, 2002, Jankowiak et al., 2005].
However, empirical studies have been hamstrung by the lack of exogenous vari-
ation in polygyny and/or a narrow scope ignoring the relevant counter-factual. The
slave trade history oers a solution to this problem assuming that it generated
plausibly exogenous variation in present day polygyny.
2.2 Social Norms Regarding Polygyny
Social norms restricting polygyny come in many avors. There are direct norms
specifying the number of concurrent wives allowed. In addition, there are norms
that indirectly curb the number of wives: regulation of divorce; periods of abstinence
following marital dissolution; admissible spousal age gaps, to name a few. The extent
to which such norms drive marriage patterns is debatable [Becker, 1991], still their
presence is notable.
Notably, White [1988] proposed that a classication of societies with respect to
polygyny based on cultural rules to be \more stable and intelligible" than one based
on frequencies. He constructed the variable \Cultural rules constraining the fre-
quency of polygyny" where on a scale of 1 to 5, 1 indicates \Monogamy prescribed"
and 5 indicates general polygyny: \Polygyny prevalent and preferred by most men
and practiced by most men of sucient age or wealth." African societies are clearly
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Table 1: Cultural Rules Constraining the Frequency of Polygyny
Pre-Industrial Societies
African Non-African
Code Description n % n %
. Missing data 0 0 3 2
1 Monogamy prescribed 2 5 25 18
2 Monogamy preferred but exceptional cases 3 7 29 20
of polygyny
3 Polygyny limited to individual men with 9 20 36 25
leadership attributes(chiefs, medicine men, etc.)
4 Polygyny limited to men of higher social class 3 7 30 21
(men of wealth, inherited rank, nobility, etc.)
5 Polygyny prevalent and preferred by most men 27 61 19 13
and practiced by most men of sucient age
or wealth to obtain wives
Total 44 100 142 100
Sample: Standard cross-cultural sample, see Murdock and White [1969].
Source: White [1988].
over-represented in the general polygyny category. Whereas 61% of African societies
were thus classied, only 13% of non-African societies were given this classication,
see Table 1. The African dominance in the general polygyny category is even more
impressive if we consider the facts that the percentages do not represent individuals
but the share of pre-industrial societies; Africa is over-represented in this category;
and industrialized societies are overwhelmingly monogamous or moderately polyg-
ynous.
In addition, norms regarding the marriage of old men to young women may
eectively limit polygyny. Polygyny tends to displace young men in favor of the
old, and in many primitive societies this conict is played out in the family pitching
old fathers against grown sons. For example, among East African pastoralists, a
daughter's marriage brings in cattle which the father then uses to purchase a bride
{ for himself or his son [Goody, 1973]. Among the Maasai a man is not allowed to
take as a wife a woman whose father is the same generation as he is [Coast, 2006].
Still, the father-son conict remains, wrote Hakansson [1989, page 125]:
Each [house] wants to increase its own cattle wealth and to ensure the
early marriages of its sons. The family head, however, wants to marry
as many wives as he can buy this will sometimes conict with the even
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distribution of cattle to houses and the early marriages of the sons.
Thus, it often happens that when a father takes a new wife he delays
the marriage of a son." [Furthermore] \between father and son there is
considerable disagreement about incoming bridewealth cattle, since the
family head will often use his authority over the herd for his own benet
instead of contributing to his sons' marriage cattle...
3 The Model
We now turn to a formal model. We will show how slave trade in the past may
result in persisting, general, polygyny.
Consider a society in which the sex ratio is initially balanced and there is no
heterogeneity in the quality of either men or women. Men and women live for
two periods, young and old. Let  2 [0; 2] denote the age of an individual, where
 2 [0; 1] corresponds to the young period and  2 [1; 2] to the old period. Men are
fecund in both periods, whereas women are fecund only when young. Marriage is
for the purpose of procreation and thus adult men can marry at any age but women
only when young.
For the narrative, we will assume that marriage decisions are made by the indi-
viduals themselves and we dene the endogenous bride price to be a payment from
husband to wife.
Population
In period t, there areMyt young men, M
o
t old men, and Ft young women. The index
t is discrete and the young and old periods each last for one unit of time so that
Myt = M
o
t+1. In this formulation, the fecund years of young women in period t can
be mapped onto the interval [t; t + 1]. Similarly, the fecund years of young men in
period t can be mapped onto the interval [t; t+1] when young and [t+1; t+2] when
old.
If a young woman is exposed to marriage for the duration of her young period, she
bears n boys and n daughters. Thus, absent external shocks, sex ratios balance in
each cohortMyt = Ft; 8t. We assume that n  1 to ensure a positive population (By
construction, young women will be married for the entirety of their young period).
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We restrict women to one husband at a time, while men can marry a young
wife once when young and once when old. That is, we consider the case of bigamy,
a modeling choice that is done for simplicity and without loss of generality. To
x ideas, monogamy in this setting might take the form of young men and women
marrying each other at the beginning of their young period. An example of bigamy
might have age 0 women marrying an old man of age 1.5, remain married to him
for until widowhood at age 0.5, and then marry a same age young man. At age 1.5,
he takes a second, age 0, wife.
Slave Trade
We model the slave trade as the removal of young men (the number of female slaves
are normalized to zero) and let t 2 [0; 1] be the proportion of young males removed
in period t. That is,Myt = (1 t)Ft andMot =Myt 1 = (1 t 1)Ft=n. Furthermore,
we assume that the degree of slave extraction is not \too large" so that the number
of young and old men combined never falls short of the number of young women:
Myt +M
o
t  Ft or (1  t) + (1  t 1) 1n  1:4
3.1 Preferences
Young Women
The instantaneous utility of young women is
uft =
8>>><>>>:
bt if married, husband young,
Bt   st if married, husband old,
 1 if unmarried,
where bt  0 is the bride price paid by a young man and Bt  0 is that paid by
an old man. Marriage to an old man is associated with utility reducing stigma st.
The basis for st could be a distaste for being a junior wife to an old (in equilibrium,
polygynous) man. However, we will assume that stigma stems from peer pressure
(see Section 3.2) in the spirit of Benabou and Tirole [2011]. That the regard of
4This assumption ensures that all old and all young men cannot marry young women, it is not
critical for our argument.
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others would enter the utility function seems plausible to us (outside of economics
it might even be considered a truism).
Young Men
The instantaneous utility of young men is
uyt =
8<: v + u(y   bt); u0() > 0; u00()  0 if married, wife young,u(y) if not,
where v is the value of a young wife; y is the wealth of a young man; and bt is the
bride price.
For simplicity, let us assume that u(x) = x. This assumption is not necessary
but allows us to solve for the bride price explicitly without using inverse functions.
Old Men
The instantaneous utility of old men is
uot =
8<: v + u(Y  Bt) if married, wife young,u(Y ) if not,
where v is the value of a young wife; Y is the wealth of an old man; and Bt is the
bride price, we assume that old men are at least as wealthy as young men, Y  y.
3.2 Social Norms and Belief Formation
The social stigma a young woman married to an old man suers depends on the
prevalence of such marriages, we assume. Let t be the share of young women
marrying an old man in period t. In an equilibrium where all young men marry
eventually during their young period (to anticipate events, the case at hand), t
serves as a measure of polygyny, since all old men married while young.
Denoting stigma by st we assume that
st =
8<: > 0 if t 2 [0; b);0 if t 2 [b; 1];
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where b  1=(1 + n). This means that non-zero stigma cost is associated with
a marriage between young woman and old man if this practice is below a certain
threshold b. However, once common enough, stigma is driven down to zero. This
is a very simple way to model stigma.5 The key assumption about the st function
is that it is decreasing in the prevalence of polygyny, which we nd quite plausible.
It is also a common way to incorporate social stigma, see Besley and Coate [1992],
Lindbeck et al. [1999] and Basu [2006].
Let et denote the ex ante belief at the start of period t about the degree of
polygyny that will prevail in that period. This belief is positively correlated with
the practice in the preceding period. For simplicity, assume that et can take one of
two values, high (b) and low (0), and that this is determined probabilistically based
on past behavior such that
et =
8<: b with probability (t 1);0 with probability 1  (t 1); (1)
where 0() > 0; (0) = 0; and (1) = 1. For simplicity, we assume that (x)  x.
3.3 Marriage Market Equilibrium
Young women always marry at the earliest possible age,  = 0, and stay married (not
necessarily to the same man) throughout their young age (recall, being unmarried
is prohibitively expensive). Thus, the supply of brides in any period t is Ft.
As for demand, men are willing to marry as long as as the bride price does not
exceed the valuation of a bride. That is, the demand for brides by young men is
dyt =
8<: M
y
t if bt  v;
0 if bt > v:
Similarly, the demand for brides by old men is
dot =
8<: Mot if Bt  v;0 if Bt > v:
5An alternative formulation is to let the stigma function be continuous such that st = s(t) with
s
0
() < 0. To ensure that the equilibrium level of polygyny is non-degenerate, all we need is u() to
be concave and for the old to be strictly wealthier than the young, Y > y.
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Aggregate Demand and Supply
Clearly, a bride price exceeding the valuation of brides implies zero demand and
therefore in equilibrium the bride prices paid by the young and by the old cannot
both exceed v. (Otherwise, aggregate demand would be zero { incompatible with
the positive supply of brides.) Moreover, because of stigma, it must be that young
men pay weakly less than old men, bt  Bt (recall that st  0). Therefore, we
are left with the following possible combinations of bride prices and ex ante beliefs
about polygyny and the associated aggregate demand Dt:
Dt = d
y
t + d
o
t =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
(a1) Myt +M
o
t if bt  v;Bt  v; and et 2 [0; b);
(a2) Myt +M
o
t if bt  v;Bt  v; and et 2 [b; 1];
(a3) Myt if bt  v;Bt > v; and et 2 [0; b);
(a4) Myt if bt  v;Bt > v; and et 2 [b; 1]:
(2)
Aggregate supply of brides St = Ft by assumption (innite disutility from sin-
glehood). However, depending on the bride prices and stigma, women may give
preference to either type of men as follows:
Table 2: Women's Preferences Conditional on Prices
Prices Women prefer to marry
(b1) Bt   st = bt either young or old men
(b2) Bt   st < bt young over old men
(b3) Bt   st > bt old over young men
Market Clearing
Marriage market clearing requires that Dt = St. Given (2), we already know that
there is no equilibrium in which only old men marry and therefore we can rule out
(b3) in Table (2) from possible equilibrium conditions. Moreover, in conditions (a3)
and (a4), Bt > v  bt, which is neither compatible with (b1) nor (b2). Therefore,
we can also rule out (a3) and (a4).
The combinations of aggregate demand and supply conditions that remain are:
(a1) and (b2) (case (c1)); and (a2) and (b1) (case (c2)). Assume that if demand ex-
ceeds supply, then brides are randomly allocated among the highest bidders. Recall
that t denotes the share of young women marrying old men.
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There are two cases to consider. In case (c1), the ex ante belief of the contem-
poraries is such that few women will marry old men. Therefore, expected level of
stigma is high. Young women will choose to marry an old man only if the bride
price he pays is suciently high to compensate for the utility loss involved in such
marriage. However, the bride prices oered by the old men net of stigma are below
what young men are oering. Therefore, young women would rather marry young
men than old men. With a high expected stigma and insucient bride price oered
by old men, none of the old men can marry. In case (c2), the contemporaries believe
that the number of young women marrying old men will be above the threshold.
Since the expected stigma is low (0), old men can in this case compete with young
men even when oering the same bride price. Since the demand for brides exceeds
supply and women are indierent between marrying young or old men, women are
randomly allocated, t =M
o
t =(M
y
t +M
o
t ) share of them marry old men, and (1 t)
share of them marry young men.6
The market clearing conditions corresponding to the classes (c1) and (c2) are
detailed in Table 3.
Table 3: Market Clearing Conditions
Quantity marrying:
Case bt Bt et women young men old men t
(c1) v [0; v] [0; b) Ft Ft 0 0
(c2) v v [b; 1] Ft (1  t)Ft tFt MotMyt +Mot
Rational Expectations
To close the model we require ex ante beliefs about prevalence of old men marrying
young women to be conrmed in equilibrium:
t = et; (3)
which corresponds to nding xed points in the (et; t) space.
6In case (c2),
Mot
Myt +M
o
t
=
(1  t 1)Ft=n
(1  t)Ft + (1  t 1)Ft=n =
1
1 + n(1  t)=(1  t 1) :
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Table 4: Slave Trades and Marriage Marekt Equilibria
Type t bt Bt St d
y
t d
o
t
A. No slave trade, past or present, t 1 = t = 0.
M 0 v [0,v] Ft Ft 0
P 11+n v v Ft (1  t )Ft tFt
B. Onset of slave extraction, t 1 = 0 and t > 0.
P' 11+n(1 t) v v Ft (1  t )Ft tFt
C. Cessation of slave extraction, t 1 > 0 and t = 0.
M 0 v [0,v] Ft Ft 0
P" 1
1+n(1 t 1) 1 v v Ft (1  t )Ft tFt
Marriage Market Equilibrium
The marriage market equilibrium is dened as the vector (t ; bt ; Bt ) that satises
the market clearing conditions (Table 3), and the rational expectations condition
(3), where ex ante beliefs are formed according to (1).
3.4 Slave Trade and Polygyny
In Table 4, we present the marriage market equilibria under various situations in-
volving past or present slave trades. When t 1 = t = 0, there are two classes of
steady-state equilibria: M(onogamous) and P(olygynous), as stated in panel A and
illustrated in Figure 1.
Panel B of Table 4 describes the marriage market equilibrium at the onset of
slave extraction, t 1 = 0 and t > 0. In this situation, case such as (c1) in Table
3 is not feasible because with t > 0, the quantity of young men is smaller than
the quantity of young women. Ruling out case (c1), we are left with a P' type of
equilibrium, also see Figure 2.
In panel C of Table 4, we present the equilibria in the aftermath of the slave
trade shock, e.g., t 1 > 0 and t = 0. In this situation, both (c1) and (c2) of Table
3 are feasible and there are two types of equilibria, M and P", see Figure 3.
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.Figure 1: Steady-State Equilibria (The pointsM and P correspond to the equilibria
detailed in Table 4, Panel A)
Figure 2: Transition from Steady-States: Onset of Slave Extraction (The point P'
correspond to the equilibrium detailed in Table 4, Panel B.)
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Figure 3: Transition from Steady-States: Cessation of Slave Extraction (The points
M and P" correspond to the equilibrium detailed in Table 4, Panel C.)
Transition Dynamics
Consider a society in which all marriages are of type M. Absent an external shock,
this society remains in M indenitely.
Now ponder the eect of a one-period slave trade shock in period t, t > 0 and
t j = t+j = 0; 8j > 0. In the next period, demographics are still perturbed since
yesterday's young are today's old. Two periods on, however, the one-period shock
has aged out and sex ratios balance for both the young and the old. The marriage
market equilibrium might, however, be permanently changed fromM to P as shown
in Figure 4.
Pt+2 and Mt+2, are both steady-state equilibria, one of the polygynous type
and the other of the monogamous type. In expectation, the degree of polygyny in
the long run is
E() = E(t+2) = (
1
1 + n(1  t))(
1
1 + n(1  t) 1 )
1
1 + n
: (4)
To see this, note that
E(t+2) = f
b + (1  
)0g+ (1  )0;
where   Pr(P"t+1jP't) and 
  Pr(Pt+2jP't;P"t+1); and the transition proba-
bilities are as detailed in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Slave Trade and Polygyny: Transition Dynamics
Intuitively, this expected value of polygyny in the long run depends on the
magnitude of the slave trade shock, t.
Proposition 1 Holding constant the pre-slave trade equilibrium, the greater the
slave trade shock, the higher the expected level of polygyny post-slave trade.
A proof is provided in Appendix A.
Male Age at First Marriage
Our measure of polygyny is closely linked to male age at marriage and a one-o
slave trade shock results not only in old men marrying more, but a delay in the
age at rst marriage for men. Recall that women marry at age 0 and that in
monogamous equilibria so do young men. Similarly to Equation (4), the expected
age at rst marriage for men in the long run following a period t shock, t > 0 and
t j = t+j = 0; 8j > 0, which we denote by E(X), is
E(X) = E(Xt+2) = (
1
1 + n(1  t))(
1
1 + n(1  t) 1 )E(Xt+2jPt+2); (5)
which comes from
E(Xt+2) = f
E(Xt+2jPt+2) + (1  
)0g+ (1  )0:
Proposition 2 Holding constant the pre-slave-trade equilibrium, the greater the
slave trade shock, the larger the expected gender gap in age at rst marriage post
slave-trade.
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A proof is provided in Appendix A.
This result is quite intuitive. Proposition 1 shows that the higher the past slave
extraction, the higher is the expected degree of polygyny in the long run. However,
given the quantity of young women, to allow the re-marriage of old men, young men
on average will have to wait longer for their rst marriage. But this delay should
be acceptable for the young men as in equilibrium they themselves will practice
polygyny once they get old.
4 Data
Our main dataset is from Nunn [2008].7 This dataset includes information on the
intensity and direction of the slave trades for the period 1400{1900 and geographic
information including distances to major locations where slaves were demanded
(from the source country's centroid), for further description of these variables see
Nunn [2008]. We complement Nunn's data set with country level information on
polygyny, age at marriage, marital status, and infant and child mortality (descriptive
statistics are in Table 6).
Polygyny
We use the number of married women over the number of married men 15 to 49
years old (see, e.g., Coast [2006] for a study using this denition). This information
is available for 50 out of the 52 countries included in Nunn [2008]. Our polygyny
measure ranges from 1.06 to 2.01, and has a mean of 1.4. To compute this measure,
we use the number of males and females who are married or in a consensual union,
obtained from the UN Demographic Yearbook: Special Census Topic 2000 Round.8
For the countries this information is not available, we use the UN World Marriage
Data 2008, which reports the percentage of population by age groups and sex who
are married or in consensual union. By multiplying these marriage rates by age
group- and sex-specic population sizes from the UN World Population Prospects,
7Available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/nunn/data_nunn.
8http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm. We used the latest
year available.
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we obtain the number of married men and women.9 No data were available for
Guinea-Bissau or Somalia.
There are a number of other ways to measure polygyny { the fraction of men
with more than one wife, the fraction of women with non-zero co-wives, etc., and
there is no \ideal" way. Thankfully, there is a fair degree of correlation between
the various measures [Low, 1988]. Appendix B discusses further the relationship
between dierent measures of polygyny used in the literature.
Figure 5 shows high correlation between our polygyny measure (married women
to married men) and the percent of married women with non-zero co-wives (from
a dierent dataset).10 We do not use the latter measure since it would reduce the
sample from 50 to 32 countries.
There are two potential concerns regarding our measure of polygyny (the num-
ber of married women to number of married men, 15-49 years). First, one might
be worried that dierential mortality between men and women upwardly biases
the measurement of polygyny. However, in our data, women who are widowed are
recorded as \widowed" rather than as \married." Therefore, our measure of polyg-
yny is unlikely to be driven by gender dierential mortality.
Second, it is possible that sex dierences in age at marriage drives our measure
of polygyny. Suppose that all women marry at 15 and all men marry at 22. Then,
even with monogamous marriage, our measure of polygyny will point to 1.25 wives
per husband ((49-14)/(49-21)). To account for this age gap we adjust the age ranges
and use ages 15-49 for women and 19-54 for men to compute polygyny in some of
our specications and our results do not change much.
Gender gap, age at rst marriage (Age gap)
9The countries for whom we used the UN World Marriage Data (http://www.un.org/esa/
population/publications/WMD2008/Main.html) and the UN World Population Prospects (http:
//esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm) are: Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Chad,
Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Lesotho, Liberia,
Libya, Mauritania, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra leone, Swaziland, and Togo. We use data on marriage
rates for the latest year available for each country. Since the population data are available for every
ve year, we use the 5th year nearest to the year for the marriage data.
10The percent of married women with non-zero cowives is based on data from the Demographic
and Health Surveys (http://www.measuredhs.com/). We used all African countries for which the
information is available, leaving us with 32 observations. If the info is available for multiple years
for the same country, we used data for the latest year.
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We use the singulate mean age of marriage by gender obtained from the UN World
Marriage Data 2008. It is the average length of single life expressed in years among
those who have ever married in the age group 15-49. It therefore measures the
average age at rst marriage over the historic period covered by the age group 15-
49, rather than the average age of those currently marrying for the rst time. If
each cohort followed the same age pattern with respect to marriage, the singulate
mean age of marriage would also be the mean age of rst marriage (by gender) for
every cohort in the population. On average, there is a 4.84 year dierence in the
male and the female singulate mean age of marriage, ranging from 1.9 to 8.8 years.
Bachelorhood
We measure bachelorhood by the percent of men in the age group 40-44 who have
never married. On average, this was true of some six percent of men in this age
group, ranging from 0 to 26.6 percent. These data are from the UN World Marriage
Data 2008.
Infant mortality
Infant mortality is the number of deaths per 1,000 in the rst year, and the data are
obtained from the World Bank, World Development Indicators for the year 2000.
Average infant mortality was 82 infants per 1000 live births, ranging from 12 to 150
deaths.
Child mortality
Child mortality is the probability per 1000 that a newborn baby will die before
reaching age ve and the data are from the World Bank, World Development Indi-
cators for the year 2000. Average child mortality was 130 deaths per 1000 children,
ranging from 14 to 550.
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5 Empirical Analysis
We focus on two questions: does general polygyny characterize polygyny in Africa;
and what are the eects of this type of polygyny. While our theory does not have
direct predictions for marital output, marital output being lower in highly polygy-
nous societies would serve as evidence in support of our theoretical argument that
general polygyny owes its existence to an accident of history rather than eciency
arguments.
To make progress on the rst question, we note that general polygyny predicts
later age at rst marriage for men (greater spousal age gaps) but not a higher frac-
tion of never married men. This can be contrasted with inequality driven polygyny
where low quality men never marry. While spousal age gaps increase with polygyny
in both types, when polygyny originates from male inequality this gap is driven
by higher order marriages { age at rst marriage for men who marry need not be
higher. Moreover, for general polygyny we expect current levels of polygyny to be
linked to past slave extraction, especially the Atlantic trade which was heavily male
biased. By contrast, for inequality driven polygyny we expect no such relationship.
For the second question { marital output { we focus on infant and child mortality
on the premise that children are an important measure of marital output. Under-
ve mortality compromises marital productivity by raising the cost of producing a
given number of children (alternatively, reducing the number of surviving children).
Below schema summarizes the proposed chain of events
Distances) SlaveExports) Polygyny) Outcomes: (6)
We rst present the bivariate correlations between polygyny and other variables of
interest in a series of scatter plots. We then show, using OLS, that our measure of
polygyny predicts larger spousal age gaps at rst marriage, but not a greater inci-
dence of never married men, consistent with general polygyny. Moreover, countries
with more polygyny are shown to have lower marital output as measured by infant
and child mortality, a nding more easily reconciled with general polygyny (over
and above inequality driven polygyny) than inequality driven polygyny alone.
The main empirical challenge is that polygyny and marital output may be driven
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by omitted country characteristics. Therefore, we also present results from IV es-
timates where polygyny is instrumented by the minimum distances to the historic
slave markets. Our IV results conrm the OLS results of economically and statisti-
cally signicant eects of polygyny.
The IV estimates suggest that a reduction of the ratio of married women to
married men from two to one (the equivalent of going from the most polygynous
country in our sample, Burkina Faso, to an essentially monogamous country such
as the Seychelles or Rwanda) would reduce the spousal age gap by 7 years, infant
mortality by 81/1000, and child mortality by 132/1000.
The posited mechanism through which the distances to historic slave markets
aect polygyny is that proximity to the points of slave demand in the New World
resulted in greater slave extraction, which in turn skewed the sex ratios in favor of
polygyny. We conclude by corroborating this linkage, Section 5.2.4.
5.1 Basic correlations: OLS estimates
We start by showing correlations in a series of scatter plots.
Figure 6 shows a clear positive relationship between slave exports (normalized
by the average population from 1400 to 1900) and present day polygyny.
Figure 7 plots polygyny and the gender gap in the singulate mean age of mar-
riage. Although their positive correlation is well known, the gure reveals a strik-
ingly strong relationship, both in statistical and economic terms. In the most polyg-
ynous countries, this gap is about seven years, while in the least polygynous countries
it is around two years.
Figure 8 plots polygyny against the percent never married men, 40-44. Under
inequality driven polygyny, we would expect more polygynous societies to also have
more never married men, whereas no relationship is expected under general polygyny
since all men marry eventually. In fact what we observe is a negative relationship,
somewhat attenuated for men in the next (and oldest available) age group, Figure
9.
Finally, Figures 10 and 11 reveal a strong positive relationship between polygyny
and infant and child mortality, respectively. Polygyny being harmful is consistent
with general polygyny but is harder to reconcile with quality polygyny.
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Turning to multivariate analysis, we start by estimating by OLS a regression
equation of the following form:
yi = 0 + 1Polygynyi +Xi + "i; (7)
where yi is the dependent variable of interest for country i: age gap, bachelorhood,
infant and child mortality.
Polygynyi is the variable measuring polygyny and 1 is our coecient of interest.
Xi is a vector of control variables. Following Nunn [2008], we include in Xi
a vector of colonizer (immediately prior to independence) indicator variables to
control for colonizer identity (colonizer identity may be an important determinant
of the health and educational infrastructure of a country, both through its impact on
human and physical capital in the country on independence, and through continued
links, notably foreign aid [Alesina and Dollar, 1998]). North African culture is
distinct from the rest of Africa, being on the Mediterranean and sharing the twin
inuences of Islam and French civil law. To capture the inuence of these factors,
we include the percent of population that is Islamic, a dummy variable indicating
North Africa, and a variable indicating whether the legal system is based on French
civil law.
In addition, we include (the log of) population density in 1400. The reason is
two fold. First, if current polygyny captures past polygyny, and if past polygyny
reects past economic development (e.g., richer areas being better able to procure
brides or oering agricultural conditions conducive to polygyny), then the coecient
1 might capture the eect of high levels of development in a country's past rather
than that of current polygyny. Therefore, we would like to control for the level of
development prior to the slave trade, and population density in 1400 may be the
best available measure (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al. [2002]). Second, high population
density might have directly impacted past polygyny, e.g., from lower transportation
cost leading to a larger catchment area for brides (facilitating the allocation of brides
across localities).
The geography and climate variables are: distance from equator, lowest monthly
rainfall, average maximum humidity, average minimum temperature, and the natu-
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ral log of coastline to area. These are factors known to aect prevalence of infectious
diseases and agricultural productivity [Sachs et al., 2001]. We also include an in-
dicator variable for whether the country is a small island, and (the log of real) per
capita GDP in 2000 (from Maddison [2003]).
Polygyny is more widespread in West Africa (consistent with the pattern of
slave trades). To make sure that we do not just capture a \West-Africa" eect,
some specications include a West-Africa indicator variable.
The results are presented in Tables 7-10. In column 1 we only include Polygyny
(and colonizer xed eects). Column 2 adds the three variables percent Islamic,
North Africa and French legal origins dummies. Column 3 adds (the natural log of)
population density in 1400. Column 4 introduces the geography covariates. Column
5 includes log real GDP per capita. Column 6 includes West Africa dummy.
Consistent with our theory and the bivariate correlations, we nd that polygyny
is associated with a greater gender gap in age at rst marriage, and higher infant and
child mortality. As for bachelorhood, once the geographic covariates are introduced,
the sign of the coecient on polygyny ips from negative to positive, but in no
specication is it signicant, consistent with general polygyny.11
5.2 Instrumental Variables Strategy
The OLS estimates show a clear association between polygyny and negative marriage
market outcomes (infant and juvenile mortality). However, there are many reasons
why the relationship need not be causal. Factors linked to development may both
improve child health and lead to a decline in polygyny. The adoption of Western
ideals may prompt an embrace of monogamy and modern medicine. Moreover,
higher levels of human capital shifts focus from child quantity to quality, resulting
in both more monogamy and better child health outcomes [Gould et al., 2008].
Additionally, increased urbanization makes large households less practical, and may
have an independent eect on child mortality. Thus, more urbanized countries may
both have lower levels of polygyny and under-ve mortality.
Furthermore, polygyny may be more common in more stratied society [Becker,
11Table 8 presents the results for ages 40-44. The results for never married men 45-49 are similar,
available from the authors on request.
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1974], and heterogenous societies may be less able to provide public goods such as
sanitation or public health measures [Alesina et al., 1999, Alesina and La Ferrara,
2000, Easterly and Levine, 1997, Miguel and Gugerty, 2005], factors likely to have
a strong impact on the under-ve mortality rate, e.g., Miller [2008]. The pattern of
foreign aid may also create an association between polygyny and child health, for
instance because aid may target maternal and child health directly, and be directed
to countries with cultural values congruous with those of the (Western) donor's.
Alternatively, aid may be disproportionately steered to countries with historical
ties, such ties often being in the form of Christian missions (outts which combined
the promotion of, inter alia, monogamy with that of health and primary education).
Although colonizer indicator variables capture some of this eect, many of the main
donors, notably the United States, Canada, the Nordic countries, and Japan, did
not have colonies in Africa [Alesina and Dollar, 1998].12
To address the issue of causality we instrument for polygyny using distances to
the dierent slave trades. Before motivating our estimation strategy, we give a brief
description of the dierent trades.
5.2.1 The African Slave Trades
Africa has a long tradition of slave trades and four main slave trades can be distin-
guished: the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the trans-Saharan, and the Red Sea trade.
Of these four, the Atlantic is the most recent and it stands out by its sheer volume
and male bias, both dictated by plantation demand in the Americas following the
continent's discovery and settlement by Europeans. The other trades were smaller
in scale, and the trans-Saharan and Red Sea trades tended to be female biased due
to Oriental demand for domestics.
The Atlantic slave trade
For the Atlantic slave trade, sex ratio among slaves (male ratio) was roughly 65%
and this ratio was similar across ports of embarkment, see Table 5.
Wrote Manning [1990, pp. 41-42]:
12Save the U.S. colony Liberia.
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Table 5: Sex Ratio among Slaves by Region of Embarkation for the Atlantic Trade
Region of embarkation Male ratio (Stdev) Shipment sample
Senegambia 0.70 (0.14) 92
Sierra Leone 0.68 (0.09) 67
Gold Coast 0.65 (0.11) 154
Bight of Benin 0.67 (0.12) 109
Bight of Biafra 0.58 (0.11) 122
West-central Africa 0.68 (0.09) 198
Windward Coast 0.62 (0.11) 105
South-east Africa 0.84 (0.06) 4
Source: Constructed by authors based on Eltis et al. [1999].
In the Western Coast] The Captors retain half of the female Captives
as Domestic slaves, and sell the rest to European slave merchants who
export them; the Captors sell almost all of the male Captives to be
exported across the Atlantic. [...] The reason for the dierence in the
destinations of female and male Captives is the dierence in prices by
sex. For male Captives, the price paid by European slave merchants
were higher than those paid by African purchasers of slaves. For female
Captives, the prices paid by African purchasers were nearly as high as
those paid by European purchasers. [...] In keeping half the women
[Captives] as Domestics, the Captors create around themselves a larger
Slave Society population. Most of the women of marriageable age among
the Domestics are brought into polygynous relationships (marriage or
concubinage), and many of them may end up in harems of the political
and military elite.[...] The Exports from the West Coast, who comprise
an initial Occidental slave population, are in the ratio of two males for
every female, and dominantly in the age group from fteen to thirty.
A Portuguese colonial census of Angola taken in the late 1770s reveals a demo-
graphic structure consistent with Manning's study. According to the census, among
the \Free blacks",13 the ratio of adult men (15-60) to adult women (14-40) in 1777-
1778 was 0.47 to 0.93 (see Miller [1988, p. 160] and studies cited therein). Wrote
Miller [1988, p. 163]:
13Those not directly owned by a European subject of the Portuguese colony. This category
accounted for 89.3% of the total population.
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In areas west of the slaving frontier, like the Portuguese territories sur-
veyed for the census, visitors would have gotten the impression of villages
lled with women and children, with the pre-pubertal girls outnumbering
the boys. Men would have been striking only by their absence. The num-
bers of young wives surrounding older males in fact astonished visitors to
the interior of Angola, unaccustomed to such demographic imbalances.
The Non-Atlantic slave trades
By contrast, the non-Atlantic slave trades did not create a surplus of young women
in the source countries. Wrote Manning [1990, pp. 45-46]:
[In the Savanna and Horn] Captives sold to slave merchants from the
Middle East and North Africa are dominantly female, in a ratio of two
females for each male. The reason for this sexual disparity, as for the
Western Coast, is dierences in prices and demand. In this case, however,
the demand for female slaves exceeds that for male slaves both in the
African Savanna and in the Orient. Further, the relative preference for
female slaves in the Orient is even greater than in Africa. [...] The
Captors of the Savanna sell two-thirds of the female Captives and one-
third of the males to North African and Middle Eastern merchants. Thus
the Captors, in making Domestic slaves of the retained Captives (with
nearly twice as many males as females), create a larger Slave Society
population. The Domestic slave women become wives and concubines
of their masters, and notably of leading gures in the society. Slave
males marry only infrequently, since their masters take the women. [...]
However, the historical magnitude of this Savanna and Horn surplus of
male slaves was not usually large.
Referring to the Indian Ocean trade, Manning [1990, p. 52] wrote:
In the Eastern Coast] The Eastern Coast contributed to both Occidental
and Oriental trade, though the Oriental trade dominated. [...] Overall
the proportions of men and women among Eastern Coast exports were
relatively even.
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5.2.2 Distances as Instruments for Polygyny
From our model, we expect the removal of young adult males to result in higher
levels of general polygyny. While the argument could be made for using the slave
trades themselves as instruments, such an approach is problematic because it is
possible that already polygynous societies participated more actively in the supply
of slaves, e.g., old men raiding young men and selling them to slave traders [Miller,
1988].
Therefore, we turn to geography to instrument for polygyny. We use Nunn
[2008]'s distances to the locations of demand as instrument for polygyny. The
exogeneity of a country's location relative to the location of slave demand seems
reasonable to us, see Nunn [2008]. Our preferred instrument is the minimum dis-
tance to the market for slaves in the Americas, AtlanticD, because of the historical
evidence that, through its male bias and sheer volume, the Atlantic trade had a
sizeable impact on local marriage markets.
In our IV strategy, the second stage outcomes of interest are: age gap, bach-
elorhood, infant and child mortality. The exclusion restriction for the IV is that
conditional on all the control variables included, Atlantic distance aects the mar-
ital outcomes only through polygyny (see (6)). An important concern regarding
this approach is that distances aect the extent of Atlantic slave trade and the At-
lantic slave trade may aect other factors besides polygyny, factors which bear on
the outcomes of interest. For instance, if the slave trades reduce trust [Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011], quality of domestic institutions, economic opportunities, etc.,
these may impact infant and child mortality. Therefore, we rst present the corre-
lations between distances and polygyny (rst stage) and distances and the second
stage outcomes (reduced form). These correlations should provide some evidence of
the mechanism we hypothesize, and do not require the strong assumptions of the
IV. We then present the IV results, which should be interpreted with caution.
5.2.3 Distances, Polygyny, and Marital Outcomes
The goal of this subsection is to establish the link:
Distances) Polygyny) Outcomes:
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Table 11 presents the results from estimating Equation (7) when polygyny is instru-
mented for using AtlanticD. All regressions include the full set of control variables
as listed in Table (6). The rst stage for the regression with age gap as the de-
pendent variable is in Column 1. Column 2 presents the rst stage for the three
other outcomes. In both cases, distance to the Atlantic slave market negatively
predicts polygyny, signicant at the 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. Columns 3
through 6 present the reduced form estimates of the eects of distance to Atlantic
slave market on marital outcomes. The signs of the estimates are consistent with
what we found using OLS: The further the country was from the slave market, the
less polygyny exists in that country today, and the lower is the male-female age gap
at rst marriage as well as infant and child mortality, with no eect on permanent
bachelorhood. In columns 7 through 10, we present the IV estimates of the impact
of polygyny on marital outcomes when polygyny is instrumented for by distances.
With the exception of fraction of never married men, the outcome for which we
do not expect general polygyny to have an eect on, the results are in the same
direction as the OLS results, and are larger and more signicant. The estimated
eect sizes are large enough to account for the dierence between the most (Burkina
Faso) and the least (Seychelles) polygynous countries in our sample.
While our instrument, AtlanticD, has sucient power predicting polygyny, one
may argue that the shown negative correlation between AtlanticD and Polygyny
might be spurious. AtlanticD tends to be inversely related to the distances to the
Orient, proximity to which may inuence polygyny. For instance, Arab traders may
have taken African wives, thus reducing polygyny among African men. Moreover,
AtlanticD might be proxying for the general facility in trade with the outside world
and if there are reasons to believe that (any) contact with the outside world should
have a systematic inuence on polygyny, not only the distances to the Atlantic slave
markets but the distances to other markets should matter as well. To address these
concerns and check whether the source of polygyny is indeed the proximity to the
Atlantic slave markets, we repeat our analysis in Table 11 with an additional instru-
ment. Specically, we use the minimum distance to other (non-Atlantic) slave mar-
kets, ISRmin (ISR for Indian Ocean, trans-Saharan or Red Sea).14 If AtlanticD were
14Specically, ISRmin is the minimum of the three distances.
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to proxy for the proximity to the Orient, we would expect it to lose its signicance
once we control for ISRmin (a more direct measure of proximity to the Orient than
AtlanticD). However, as shown in Columns 1 and 2 in Table 12, polygyny seems
better explained by AtlanticD than by ISRmin. In addition, the results go against
the story of general facility with foreign trade since the coecients on AtlanticD
and ISRmin have opposite signs. The two distance measures are jointly signicant
in explaining polygyny and the coecients are of the hypothesized sign: negative
for the Atlantic distance and positive for the non-Atlantic distance (ISRmin). The
reduced form estimates (columns 3 through 6) and the IV estimates (columns 7
through 10) are similar to those obtained when only the Atlantic distance was used
as an instrument, albeit 3/4th of the size.15
An additional concern is that the above results are driven by regional idiosyncra-
cies. As a robustness check, we repeat our main analysis on two (more homogenous)
subsets of the data, one where we exclude countries with zero slave trade and one
where we exclude North African and Island countries. The results for these subsets
are qualitatively similar, (instrumented) polygyny has a positive and signicant ef-
fect on age gaps, infant and child mortality, although the point estimates are larger
and estimated with less precision, Table 13.
Furthermore, we repeat our main analysis based on an alternative measure of
polygyny, the ratio of married women (15-49) to married men (19-54), to make sure
that our baseline polygyny measure is not driven by gender dierences in marriage
age as discussed earlier. The results are quite similar using this alternative measure
of polygyny, Table 14 (and Table 11), despite losing sample size.16
15An additional argument for considering both AtlanticD and ISRmin as instruments is that
although AtlanticD should be the primary factor aecting Atlantic slave trades, proximity to the
other markets might also matter in determining the volume of Atlantic exports. Imagine two
countries with same AtlanticD but with dierent ISRmin and there was demand for slaves from all
directions. In this situation, if one country sends more slaves to the Atlantic trade than the other
country, exploiting the other distances as well might give more precision although more instruments
will make it more subject to potential weak instrument issues.
16In the UN World Marriage Data, marital status is not reported for ages above 49 for three
countries (Liberia, Namibia, and Swaziland), hence the reduction in sample size.
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5.2.4 Evidence of A Mechanism
The rationale behind our instrumenting strategy is that the distance to the Atlantic
slave trade impacted current polygyny via past (male-biased) slave extraction. In-
deed, there is a strong positive association between Atlantic slave exports and cur-
rent polygyny, as presented in columns 1 through 3 in Table 15. We present results
suggesting a causal link: the positive relationship remains when the slave trades are
instrumented for using the distances. Specically, we examine the link:
Distances) SlaveExports) Polygyny:
Table 15 presents the results. Column 7 shows the second stage estimate of the eect
of the Atlantic slave trade on polygyny, when AtlanticD is used as an instrument
for the slave trade (rst stage results are in Column 4). The eect is positive
and economically and statistically highly signicant. An increase in Atlantic slave
exports by ten percent raises polygyny by 0:7 percentage points or by about one
third of the standard deviation. This nding replicates that of Dalton and Leung
[2011].
Lastly, we present in Table 16 evidence for the link
Distances) SlaveExports) Outcomes:
Columns 1 through 4 show the OLS estimates and columns 6 through 9 the IV
estimates. The IV estimates show that overall impact of the Atlantic slave trades
on the marital outcomes. Consistent with our hypothesis, the Atlantic slave ex-
ports increase male-female age gap at rst marriage, but not the rate of permanent
bachelorhood. To the extent that the most plausible determinants of today's marital
outcomes (age gap, and infant and child mortality) are accounted for by the included
controls, especially current GDP per capita [Nunn, 2008], it seems unlikely that the
estimated eects of slave exports on outcomes are driven entirely by channels other
than polygyny, in particular our result for the age gap.
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6 Conclusion
Polygyny in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by late but universal marriage for
men, thus the qualier \general." Unlike inequality-driven polygyny, where high
quality men obtain more wives while leaving lower quality men unmarried, it is un-
clear how general polygyny might be ecient, rendering its presence all the more
puzzling. Our paper proposes that general polygyny traces its roots to the African
slave trade { the disproportionate extraction of young males { and provides a theo-
retical framework for understanding how general polygyny might arise from a tem-
porary surplus of young women.
We argue that due to stickiness in beliefs, conventions and social norms, countries
that were more heavily exposed to slave extraction in the past might have settled
in a highly polygynous equilibrium despite its being, in the present day, inferior to
monogamy. If general polygyny and monogamy are both feasible equilibria (where
under balanced sex ratios, each obtains the sum total of one wife) and general
polygyny's prevalence relies on the history of slave trade as opposed to its eciency,
then interventions to curb polygyny may be justied. In the presence of multiple
equilibria, a one-time intervention can suce to achieve a regime change. And unlike
in a unique equilibrium case, such interventions do not have perverse eects.
Even a \one-spouse-at-a-time" rule limits polygyny (for practical purposes, mar-
riage has a minimum-eciency duration). Such a rule could, if applied to a society
dominated by general polygyny, lower the spousal age gap and thus be benecial.
General polygyny does not call into question male heterogeneity as a driver
of polygyny. Modern day marriage in the West might be characterized by serial
polygyny [Bergstrom, 1994], and a high divorce-remarriage equilibrium may very
well be ecient [Chiappori and Weiss, 2006].17 Our paper proposes an additional
explanation for polygyny, with a particular application to African marriage patterns.
Our analysis emphasizing the possibility of multiple equilibria and the role of
social norms suggests that cultural prescription of monogamy, or against inter-
generational marriage, may be socially ecient, a departure from the literature
17In a recent paper, De la Croix and Mariani [2012] analyze the evolution of marriage institutions
inside a political economy framework and provide conditions under which monogamy, polygamy or
serial monogamy can arise as an equilibrium voting outcome.
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which so far has focused on monogamy rules as being populist measures [Lagerlof,
2010], and possibly ineective [Becker, 1974].
Our paper adds to the rather few voices in Economics calling for restrictions
on polygyny (notably Tertilt [2005]). One obvious policy instrument is the legisla-
tive route. Although the eectiveness of that approach can be debated, monogamy
was eectively promoted through legal reforms in the East Asia. First in Japan
(Meiji restoration) [MacFarlane, 2002, Fuess, 2004] and subsequently in China (Re-
publican family code) [Bernhardt, 1999] by the removal of the legal recognition of
concubines. These reforms were part and parcel of a deliberate eort to modern-
ize society through emulation of Western institution, including western family law
[Goode, 1970, MacFarlane, 2002].
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Polygyny (Wives/husbands) 50 1.40 0.21 1.06 2.01
Male-Female Gap in Age at First Marriage 44 4.84 1.57 1.90 8.80
% Men never married, 40-44 50 6.23 6.24 0.00 26.40
Infant mortality, deaths in 50 81.75 32.46 12.10 150.20
rst year/1,000 live births
Child mortality, deaths in 50 129.54 58.86 13.60 250.30
years 1 through 4/1,000 live births
ln(Slaves/avg pop. 1400-1900, all) 50 9.15 3.70 3.91 14.40
ln(Slaves/avg pop. 1400-1900, Atlantic) 50 7.80 3.82 1.01 14.40
ln(Slaves/avg pop. 1400-1900, non-Atlantic) 50 6.60 3.64 2.30 12.99
Instruments:
Minimum Atlantic trade distance 50 7.36 3.24 3.65 16.39
Minimum non-Atlantic trade distance 50 2.36 1.13 0.03 4.69
Controls:
Colonizer indicator: Britain 50 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: France 50 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: Portugal 50 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: Belgium 50 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: Spain 50 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: UN 50 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Colonizer indicator: Italy 50 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Percent Islam 50 34.05 38.77 0.00 99.00
North Africa 50 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
West Africa 50 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
French legal origin 50 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00
Distance from the equator 50 13.75 9.98 0.20 36.00
Lowest monthly rainfall 50 9.22 16.28 0.00 69.00
Avg. max humidity 50 71.46 12.12 35.00 95.00
Avg. min temperature 50 8.54 7.56 -9.00 19.00
ln(Coast/area) 50 -0.32 3.27 -4.61 6.98
Small island 50 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
West Africa 50 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00
ln(real GDP/capita, 2000) 50 7.15 0.84 5.38 9.27
ln(Pop./area, 1400) 50 0.09 1.36 -2.30 3.04
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Appendix A: Proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let 11+n(1 t)  t and 11+n(1 t) 1  t+1. Know that t+1 < t when t > 0. Also
know that
@t
@t
=
1
fn(1  t) + 1g2 > 0;
@t+1
@t
=
 n
fn+ (1  t)g2 < 0:
Taking the derivative of E(t+2) with respect to t, we obtain
@E(t+2)
@t
=
1
1 + n
f0(t )
@t
@t
(t+1) + (

t )
0
(t+1)
@t+1
@t
g
=
1
1 + n
f0(t )
@t
@t
(t+1)gf1 +
(t )
0
(t+1)
@t+1
@t
0(t )
@t
@t
(t+1)
g
=
1
1 + n
f0(t )
@t
@t
(t+1)g[1 +
t f@(

t+1)
@t+1
t+1
(t+1)
g@

t+1
@t
t+1f@(

t )
@t
t
(t )
g@t@t
]
=
1
1 + n
f0(t )
@t
@t
(t+1)g(1 +
t
@t+1
@t
t+1
@t
@t
)
since
@(t+1)
@t+1
t+1
(t+1)
=
@(t )
@t
t
(t )
is the elasticity of () with respect to , a con-
stant.
Because 
0
(t ) > 0 and (t+1) > 0, know that 
0
(t )
@t
@t
(t+1) > 0. Therefore,
for
@E(t+2)
@t
 0 to be true, we require 

t
@t+1
@t
t+1
@t
@t
  1. Plugging the values for t ,
t+1,
@t
@t
, and
@t+1
@t
into
t
@t+1
@t
t+1
@t
@t
, we require
t
@t+1
@t
t+1
@t
@t
=
 n
1  t
1
n + 1  t
1 + 1 tn
  1;
or
1 (1 + 1
n
)  1
n
(1 +
1  t
n
);
which is necessarily true because with n  1 and t 2 [0; 1], 1  1n and 1 + 1n 
1 + 1 tn . Therefore,
@E(t+2)
@t
 0.
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6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that the fecund years of men who are young in period  were mapped onto
the interval [; +1]. Denote the equilibrium polygyny in that period by  . Denote
the probability that a man marries for the rst time at age x 2 [0; 1] or at point
 + x 2 [;  + 1] by f(xj ), which can be expressed as
f(xj ) = (1   )x f
  ln( )
(1   )2 g;
where the constant   ln( )
(1  )2 is multipled to (1   )x to ensure thatZ 1
0
f(xj )dx = 1:
With this density, the probability that a man ever marries during his young period
[;  + 1] is unity. That is, all young men, who are ex ante identical, can marry in
expectation. The question is whether one will ex post end up marrying early or late
during the young period. In period  , a young man's expected age at rst marriage
is
E(X jP ) =
Z 1
0
xf(xj )dx
=   
1    
1
ln
;
which, when evaluated in the polygynous equilibrium in  = t+2 (i.e., t+2 =
1
1+n),
is equal to   1n + 1ln(1+n) . Plugging this into E(Xt+2) in (5), we obtain
E(Xt+2) = (
1
1 + n(1  t))(
1
1 + n(1  t) 1 )f 
1
n
+
1
ln(1 + n)
g:
Then,
@E(Xt+2)
@t
= f  1
n
+
1
ln(1 + n)
g(1 + n)@E(

t+2)
@t
 0
because with n  1,   1n + 1ln(1+n) > 0 and 1 + n > 0, and
@E(t+2)
@t
 0 from
Proposition 1.
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Appendix B: Measurement of Polygyny
There are a number of ways to measure polygyny and we discuss here the interlinkage
between four dierent measures that have been used in the literature.
Consider an economy with m men in total. 1   p fraction of them are married
monogamously and p are polygynously. Suppose the average number of wives among
the polygynous men is q.
1. Percentage of men who are polygynously married: p
2. Average number of wives among all married men:
(1  p) 1 + (p) q
3. Percentage of women who are polygynously married:
pq
1  p+ pq  
4. Number of married women to number of married men:
(1  p)m 1 + pm q
m
 
We use measure 4 in the paper. However, 2 and 4 are essentially the same
measures.
We can also examine more closely the properties of  and .
@
@p
= q   1 > 0;
@
@q
= p > 0:
Compare this with the properties of .
@
@p
=
q
(1  p+ pq)2 > 0;
@
@q
=
p(1  p)
(1  p+ pq)2 > 0:
Clearly, both  and  have the \correct" properties and the two measures are highly
correlated, see Figure 5.
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